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Introduction 
 
A rapidly growing trend in the business of professional sports is the use of dynamic 
pricing as a tool for maximizing revenue generation.  Dynamic pricing (DP) is defined 
as a system in which prices respond to supply and demand pressures in a real time 
(or nearly real time) manner (Sahay 2007).  American Airlines is credited with the 
first widespread use of DP as a pricing tool to handle the mismatches in supply and 
demand for certain flights (McAfee & te Velde 2006).  DP has spread to numerous 
other industries, including entertainment, hotels, manufacturing to order, and lately, 
to Major League Baseball.   
 
Conceptually, dynamic pricing can be understood as on a per unit basis as: 
 
Price = Transaction Cost + Variable Cost + Markup 
 
where the markup is assigned according to what the market will bear, with the lowest 
acceptable price being the sum of a transaction cost plus the variable cost for a unit 
for sale. 
 
The goal of a DP model is typically one of profit maximization; however, the 
implementation of a profit maximization strategy is complex. In the airline industry, 
maximizing the revenue for a single flight by filling every seat through discounting 
likely means that later flights to the same destination will be difficult to maximize.  
In addition, competing carriers in the same segment will likely react to price changes 
with their own pricing changes, creating a very dynamic marketplace.   
 
DP is typically most effective when two product characteristics are present 
(McAfee & te Velde 2006).  
1. The product/service has a specific expiration date, at which point the value 
for the product service becomes zero, such as a hotel room, an airline flight, 
an event ticket, or a time-dated (“sell before”) product. This creates a 
pressure on the seller to liquidate inventory as the expiration date 
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approaches, which potentially creates a downward pressure on prices.  
This is particularly true when supply exceeds demand. 
2. Second, the capacity for the product/service is fixed and can only be 
increased at a relatively high marginal cost. This characteristic creates the 
opposite effect of upward pressure on pricing, especially when demand 
exceeds supply. 
 
Rascher, McEvoy, Nagel, & Brown (2007) posited that MLB teams were failing 
to capture millions of dollars of revenue by not using dynamic pricing, thereby 
allowing the secondary market to exploit the demand for certain high demand games. 
Three years later, the San Francisco Giants were credited with implementing the 
first dynamic pricing system in Major League Baseball (Upton 2010).  Since this 
introduction in 2010, it is estimated1 that twenty-eight of thirty MLB teams (primary 
market) are dynamically pricing some tickets for the 2015 season.  The secondary 
market for MLB tickets is largely dominated by StubHub, which enables buyers (both 
individual ticket holders and ticket brokers who purchase blocks of tickets for re-sale) 
who wish to sell tickets to price their tickets dynamically.  This rapid adoption of DP 
in the MLB primary market is based upon the belief that the use of DP generates 
increased revenues. 
 
DP has spread rapidly across Major League Baseball, and one of the questions 
that remains unanswered in the existing literature is how DP in Major League 
Baseball is different from DP as it was originally developed in the airline industry.  
The goal of this paper is to examine these similarities and differences and to examine 
the issues surrounding the use of dynamic pricing within Major League Baseball. 
 
Price Dispersion, Product Expiration, and Capacity 
 
Models of dynamic pricing suggest that prices should rise after tickets initially go on 
sale, then fall as the event approaches in order to maximize revenue. McAfee & te 
Velde (2006) found this to be partially correct in their study of DP in the airline 
industry – ticket prices rose an average of $28.20 two weeks before take-off, and then 
rose another $50 in the week before takeoff. Rather than decline immediately before 
departure, airline ticket prices actually rose another $16 the night before take-off. 
This data was effectively confirmed in a 2011 study by Airlines Reporting 
Corporation, which found that prices are 40% above average if purchased the day of 
travel but were 6% below average if purchased six weeks prior to departure (Sakraida 
2012).  Escobari (2012) also found that airline prices for a 100 passenger aircraft 
increase an average of $1.53 for each less seat that remains available, and that price 
increases accelerate during the final two weeks due to a combination of reduced 
capacity and price inelasticity among business travelers.   
 
                                                 
1 Private discussion with a MLB team official, April 2015. 
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One of the reasons airline ticket prices generally do not fall as the event 
horizon approaches is the desire for airlines to price discriminate between different 
types of customers. In effect, an airline using DP can charge more to customers that 
are willing to pay more for a last minute ticket (Sweeting 2012).  The lack of a drop 
in pricing at the end to maximize revenues is likely a function of not having a pool of 
travelers waiting for a potential price reduction (people need a reason to travel), and 
an airline not wanting to inadvertently reward travelers who wait until the last 
minute to book a ticket. 
 
StubHub and Ebay are examples of a platform for dynamic pricing in the 
entertainment industry, where prices can fall as an event becomes closer and event 
supply exceeds demand. These declines accelerate as the event comes closer and 
frequently range in the 30-60% discount from the original ticket price (Sweeting 
2012).  
 
Consumer Decision Making and Dynamic Pricing 
 
Consumer decision making processes are an important consideration in creating a 
DP model.  Many DP models are based upon deterministic decision models; that is, 
there is little uncertainty in demand and purchase decisions are predominantly a 
function of pricing decisions.  (An options market for a commodity would be an 
example.)  Such classic approaches to DP assume that consumers make purchase 
decisions when the price of the item to be purchased drops below the value assigned 
to it (for example, when an airline ticket that is valued at $300 drops below $300 in 
price, the consumer purchases the ticket.)  This viewpoint has correctly been 
described as myopic (Levin, McGill, & Nediak 2010). The reality for MLB tickets, 
airline tickets, hotel reservations, etc. is that such product markets are 
fundamentally stochastic and influenced by a combination of deliberate actions 
(pricing, promotion, etc.), random events, and events beyond the control of the seller 
(winning percentage, weather conditions, etc.). As an example, regression modeling 
of minor league baseball games has shown that even with the independent variables 
of winning percentage, weather, day of the week, and presence/absence of promotions, 
nearly half of all variation in ticket sales remained unaccounted (Drea 1991). 
 
In reality, consumers are likely to be strategic in their behavior by learning 
how certain perishable items are priced in a DP environment (Talluri & van Ryzin 
2004).   As the level of involvement with a dynamically priced item increases, it 
becomes increasingly likely that consumers move away from a deterministic DP 
model (purchase occurs when value exceeds price) and become more strategic. 
Consumers are likely to communicate with other consumers regarding high 
involvement purchases, becoming more sophisticated and strategic in their decision 
making to find a price position that maximizes their return (the difference between 
price and value assigned).  This implies that to maximize revenue from consumers, 
the process by which dynamic prices are set should not be completely transparent to 
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consumers.  The pricing systems within most major airlines are “remarkably opaque 
to the consumer, which is not surprising given one estimate that American Airlines 
changes half a million prices per day” (McAfee & te Velde 2006). If the time of the 
lowest price point can be readily estimated by a consumer and if the consumer is 
effectively rewarded for waiting with a lower price, the marginal revenue from each 
ticket will decrease as consumers optimize their return by timing their purchases.   
 
Dynamic pricing has its criticisms, which focus on two issues: negative 
influences on consumer search behavior, and issues of price fairness.  DP complicates 
search processes for consumers, who must weigh whether to purchase a ticket early 
or to delay a purchase to see if prices fall without knowing how the dynamic model 
works (Furtwengler 2011).  Consumer perceptions of the “fairness” of dynamically set 
prices is a function of the magnitude of the price increase, the extent to which the 
customer is loyal, and the temporal proximity of the price difference (Dai 2010).  
Consumers are likely to describe dynamically set prices as unfair when the difference 
is to their disadvantage (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba 2003). Loyal customers were found 
to have reduced perceptions of price unfairness (than non-loyal customers) when a 
price change was small or temporally distant; however, when the price change was 
large and/or recent the perceptions of price unfairness were greater (Dai 2010). 
 
Dynamic Pricing in the Airline and MLB Industries 
 
Extending DP from the airline industry to MLB tickets requires an understanding of 
how the two industries are similar and different as it applies to pricing.  Clearly, some 
similarities exist: 
 
1. Both airline and MLB tickets are sold in advance, and unsold tickets expire 
at departure/game time (perishable). 
2. Capacity is set in advance and can only be modified at a significant 
marginal cost. 
3. There is considerable uncertainty about aggregate demand than cannot be 
resolved solely through pricing. 
4. Consumers operate with imperfect information, but improve their decision 
making over time in response to learning (primary vs. secondary markets, 
purchase timing.) 
 
There are numerous differences between the airline industry and MLB 
regarding the influences for dynamic pricing, as shown in Table 1.  Airline ticket 
pricing features several factors which contribute to highly complex DP models.  These 
include the presence of direct competitors within the airline industry and the 
interactive effect that changes in process have on competitor prices (and vice versa). 
While MLB teams have direct competitors, a consumer is less likely to purchase a 
ticket for a game from a competing team in order to obtain a lower price. 
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Table 1: Dynamic Pricing Influences: Differences between Airline Tickets 
and MLB Tickets 
 
 Airlines Major League Baseball 
Competitors Multiple direct competitors 
in geographic proximity are 
a direct influence on prices. 
Direct competitors have 
limited influence on prices, 
and are seldom in 
geographic proximity.  
Generic or total budget 
competitors are a greater 
influence. 
Secondary 
Markets 
No secondary market Active secondary market 
(StubHub) 
Product 
Differentiation 
Low.  Product is viewed to 
some extent as a 
commodity, differentiated 
on price, services, and 
convenience 
High.  Since there are few 
direct competitors, MLB 
tickets compete against 
generic budget competitors 
for discretionary spending 
Categories of 
tickets 
Few. Typically coach and 
first class, with some 
variations. 
Many, depending on 
location and amenities. 
Risk for 
perceptions of 
price 
unfairness 
Low.  Prices tend to move as 
an industry, so perceptions 
of unfairness by individual 
competitors is rare. 
High, if a competitor allows 
prices to rise unrestrained 
for high demand games. 
Impulse 
purchase 
Low. Buyers often make 
purchase decisions several 
weeks prior to departure.  
Impulse purchases are 
infrequent. 
Varied.  Some purchases 
are made weeks/months in 
advance, but many tickets 
are sold based on an 
impulse basis on the day of 
game. 
 
One of the key differences between the use of DP in the airline industry and 
MLB ticketing surrounds the potential for negative repercussions for perceived price 
unfairness. Because airline ticket prices tend to move and down collectively as an 
industry, individual airlines are unlikely to be perceived as exhibiting price 
unfairness for fluctuating prices since ticket prices for competitors are likely to be 
fluctuating as well.  (The exception would be tickets purchased within hours of 
departure when only one competitor has available capacity.)   
 
A second key distinction between the airline and MLB industries is that MLB 
ticket buyers are both consumers and fans.  A fan has a monetary value that is in 
addition to the ability to purchase single game tickets, including pre-sold 
(season/package) tickets, media viewership, parking concessions, and the purchase of 
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licensed merchandise. Perceptions of price unfairness among the fans of a particular 
MLB team potentially impacts these additional revenue streams. MLB teams are 
advised to avoid maximizing the ticket revenue stream for exceptionally high demand 
tickets at the risk of triggering perceptions of price unfairness, which would lower 
behavioral intention to re-purchase. 
 
The Zone of Reasonableness and MLB Ticket Pricing 
 
Another key distinction between airline and MLB ticket pricing is the effect of the 
secondary market (StubHub) on primary market ticket sales.  Unlike the primary 
market, the MLB secondary market operates on a more market driven basis for ticket 
pricing with less of a concern for perceptions of price unfairness or the potential 
negative effects of underselling the prices paid by season ticket holders.  If a ticket 
with an initial value of $100 is sold later on StubHub for $300, the perceptions of 
price unfairness are focused on the secondary market provider (StubHub) and not the 
MLB team that no longer controls the ticket price.  The secondary market is also 
unconcerned with any effects of price unfairness when individual game tickets fall 
below the per game ticket price paid by a season ticket holder.  This frequently results 
in a broader range of potential ticket prices found in the secondary market, compared 
to the restricted range of prices in the primary market. 
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One way of understanding the differences of DP in the primary and secondary 
markets is through the application of the “zone of reasonableness” pricing concept to 
the field of dynamic pricing.  The zone of reasonableness is a concept used in both 
energy pricing (Fox-Penner & Wharton 2007) and freight pricing (Drea & Hanna 
2006) to determine the floor and ceiling prices for a particular item.  In the MLB 
primary market ticket pricing, the range of available ticket price positions is bounded 
on the lower end by the price per game paid by season ticket holders, and on the upper 
end by a price above which perceptions of price unfairness would likely develop.  In 
the MLB ticket secondary market, the range of potential ticket prices is considerably 
broader, since the secondary market in unencumbered by perceived lower price limit 
imposed by season ticket holders or concerns of price unfairness as an upper limit. 
Not pricing below the per game price paid by a season ticket holder is believed to be 
an important mechanism to guarantee season ticket holders that they are receiving 
the best price per game for their tickets and that they would not benefit by purchasing 
tickets individually in the primary market.  In 2013, MLB entered into an agreement 
with StubHub to establish a minimum ticket price of $6, which includes all 
transaction fees (Fisher 2012), and this price establishes the lower price limit for the 
secondary market.  
 
There is support that some professional sports teams use a “zone of 
reasonableness” concept when implementing DP. For example, a high demand MLB 
ticket would be the San Francisco Giants vs. Oakland Athletics at AT&T Park in San 
Francisco on Friday, July 24, 2015.  A ticket purchased through the team in the lower 
box area was priced at $122.50 from primary market (SF Giants) vs. an average price 
of $162.15 in the secondary market (StubHub prices for this area ranged from $102.95 
to $219.95). By comparison, a low demand ticket in a lower box area for the June 29, 
2015 game between the Cincinnati Reds and the Minnesota Twins at Great American 
Ball Park in Cincinnati was priced at $37 in the primary market (Cincinnati Reds) 
vs. an average price of $24.85 in the secondary market (StubHub prices for this area 
ranged from $16.83 to $33.01). In each of these two examples, the MLB teams appear 
to have constrained the range of prices in the primary market in order to protect the 
interests of season ticket holders and fans. 
 
Teams that routinely approach stadium capacity have the flexibility of 
pursuing additional pricing objectives beyond profit maximization. The St. Louis 
Cardinals, which use DP and routinely sell out, had 79% of home games in the 2014 
season with some tickets priced at $10 or less and 36% of home games had some 
tickets priced for $5. (St. Louis Cardinals, 2015).  This is done by making some areas 
unavailable for season ticket sales, such as high in the top deck of the stadium, and 
in some areas of the bleachers. These sentiments were echoed by Joe Strohm, VP for 
Ticket Sales from the Cardinals.  “The biggest challenge was communicating the new 
pricing structure to our fans and overcoming the concern of season ticket holders that 
we would be undercutting their price.  We have guaranteed season holders that we 
will never sell individual tickets below the game value of their ticket” (Rishe 2012).  
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Carr & Lovejoy (2000) previously considered this goal of pricing in order to 
sellout as a poor strategy in industries such as airlines and hotels, but it may have 
value in professional sports ticket markets where the presence of a sellout has 
benefits for enhancing the attractiveness of a ticket and emphasizing the scarcity. 
 
Discussion/Conclusions 
 
For the majority of entities using DP, the primary pricing objective is profit 
maximization.  While both airlines and MLB teams use DP and embrace profit 
maximization, the implementation of DP in each industry is substantially different.  
Some of these discrepancies are related to different market structures, with a) more 
direct competition and less brand differentiation in the airline industry and b) the 
presence of an active secondary market for MLB tickets.  At the same time, it is worth 
noting that airlines have customers and MLB teams have fans, some of whom are 
ticket buying customers and all of whom contribute to the revenue stream for the 
MLB team.  As a result, the implementation of DP in MLB ticket sales is different 
from the implementation of DP within the airline industry. 
  
MLB tickets priced using DP are constrained at the upper and lower levels by 
the “fan as a customer” duality faced by team ticket staffs.  The lower level of 
acceptable ticket prices is constrained by per game prices paid by season ticket 
holders, while the upper level of acceptable prices is constrained by issues of price 
fairness, which is more difficult to quantify.  Secondary MLB ticket markets do not 
have these same constraints, which results in a greater level of price dispersion on 
the secondary market.  These differences are represented by the zone of 
reasonableness pricing model. 
 
As a tool for maximizing MLB ticket revenue, DP is most effective when the 
demand for tickets exceeds the perceived supply.  This scenario allows an MLB team 
to extract more value from the transaction by setting a dynamically priced ticket 
higher than the price paid by a season ticket holder, yet below a price point that 
triggers perceptions of price unfairness.  In a scenario where the demand for tickets 
does not exceed the supply, DP provides a basis for price discrimination by charging 
a higher price to buyers who purchase tickets within the last day before game time 
have the ability to pay a price premium for such decisions.   
 
One of the issues for future research in this area is to quantify the costs 
incurred by MLB teams for the constraints that prevent teams from fully maximizing 
revenues (as occurs in the secondary market), and to determine what actions, if any, 
can be undertaken that would allow dynamically set process to fluctuate more fully 
in accordance with market demands. 
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